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Abstract
This article situates Japan in the international climate security debate by analysing competing climate change discourses.
In 2020, for the first time, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment included the term “climate crisis” (kikō kiki) in its
annual white paper, and the Japanese parliament adopted a “climate emergency declaration” (kikō hijō jitai sengen). Does
this mean that Japan’s climate discourse is turning toward the securitisation of climate change? Drawing on securitisation
theory, this article investigates whether we are seeing the emergence of a climate change securitisation discourse that
treats climate change as a security issue rather than a conventional political issue. The analysis focuses on different stake‐
holders in Japan’s climate policy: the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the parliament, the Cabinet, and sub‐ and non‐state actors. Through a discourse analysis of
ministry white papers and publications by other stakeholders, the article identifies a burgeoning securitisation discourse
that challenges, albeit moderately, the status quo of incrementalism and inaction in Japan’s climate policy. This article
further highlights Japan’s position in the rapidly evolving global debate on the urgency of climate action and provides
explanations for apparent changes and continuities in Japan’s climate change discourse.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is undeniably one of the most pressing
issues of our time. Global warming “will amplify exist‐
ing risks and create new risks for natural and human
systems” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
2014, p. 13). The international community adopted the
Paris Agreement in 2015 to limit “the increase in the
global average temperature to well below 2 °C above
pre‐industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the tem‐
perature increase to 1.5 °C above pre‐industrial levels”
(UN, 2015, p. 3):
[L]imiting global warming to 1.5 °C, compared with
2 °C, could reduce the number of people both
exposed to climate‐related risks and susceptible to
poverty by up to several hundred million by 2050
[and]may reduce the proportion of theworld popula‐
tion exposed to a climate change‐induced increase in
water stress by up to 50%. (Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, 2018, p. 9)
Japan is already experiencing the impacts of climate
change. The Global Climate Risk Index, which looks at
losses and fatalities stemming from extreme weather
events, ranked Japan as the most affected country in the
world in 2018 and fourth‐most in 2019 (Eckstein et al.,
2019, 2021). In 2018, a heatwave that killed more than
1500 people “could not have happened without human‐
induced global warming” (Imada et al., 2019). Given the
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increasing impact on people’s livelihoods, this article
investigates to what extent Japan’s climate change dis‐
course addresses global warming as a security challenge.
Security‐related climate change discourse can be fur‐
ther divided into two discourses: 1) a “conflict” dis‐
course that focuses on the link between climate change
and resource scarcity, which can lead to conflict and
consequently threaten state stability, and 2) a “secu‐
rity” discourse that highlights the link between cli‐
mate change and human security—particularly threats
to people’s livelihoods (Busby, 2019; Detraz & Betsill,
2009). The conflict‐centred discourse’s focus on military
responses has been criticised as detrimental to efforts
aimed at limiting climate change (Detraz & Betsill, 2009;
Elliott, 2012; McDonald, 2013).
In 2007, the impact of climate change on peace
and security was discussed for the first time in the UN
Security Council. Japan’s representative showed little
enthusiasm for linking climate and security (UN Security
Council, 2007). This reflected how security is concep‐
tualised in Japan, as either “national security” (anzen
hoshō) or “comprehensive security” (sōgō anzen hoshō).
The Ministry of Defence, in charge of national security,
does not deem climate change a relevant issue concern‐
ing military matters. Although the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) adopts the broader notion of human
security, it has thus far refrained from linking it to cli‐
mate change (Kameyama & Ono, 2021). Occurrences
of securitisation in Japan’s foreign and defence policy
are limited to traditional security issues such as China’s
military rise (Schulze, 2016) and North Korea’s nuclear
development and past abductions of Japanese citizens
(Hagström&Hanssen, 2015). Since “climate conflict” dis‐
course is largely absent in Japan, this article focuses on
“climate security” discourse.
For decades, UN organisations and climate activists
have been trying to securitise climate change, i.e., make
policymakers treat the issue with the urgency of a secu‐
rity threat (de Wilde, 2008; McDonald, 2013). Recent
examples includeGreta Thunberg (2019a), who famously
warned at the World Economic Forum that “Our house
is on fire,” as well as UN Secretary‐General António
Guterres (2019), who has stressed that “if we don’t
urgently change our ways of life, we jeopardise life itself.”
In 2019, a wave of “climate and environmental
emergency” declarations began sweeping the globe.
By October 2020, 1,788 jurisdictions in 31 countries
had declared climate emergencies, covering more than
820 million citizens (Climate Emergency Declaration
Campaign, 2020). Further signalling a climate security
discourse gaining traction are “climate crisis” state‐
ments, for example in the EU’s updated 2020 Nationally
Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement
(EU, 2020) and in US President Joe Biden’s (2021)
remarks on “Climate Day” on day seven of his presidency.
In Japan, climate change has hitherto been “framed
as an economic as well as an energy problem”
(Kameyama, 2017, p. 167). However, the Ministry of the
Environment (MOE) included the term “climate crisis”
(kikō kiki) in its annual white paper in 2020 (MOE, 2020).
It attracted media attention for being the first govern‐
mental publication to use the term “climate crisis.” Later
that year, the Japanese parliament declared a “climate
emergency” (Diet of Japan, 2020).
The recent emergence of security‐related climate
change rhetoric in Japan has not yet been covered in
the academic literature. Since the first climate emer‐
gency declarations emerged in Japan in late 2019, sig‐
nalling a potential turning point in Japan’s climate change
discourse, the in‐depth analysis of recent documents
focuses on the short yet crucial period from late 2019 to
early 2021.
This article poses the following research question:
To what extent is Japan addressing climate change as
a security threat? Put differently, does the use of the
terms “climate emergency” and “climate crisis” signal a
discursive shift toward climate securitisation in Japan’s
climate policy?
1.1. Japan’s Climate Change Policy and Discourse
Japan’s climate policy has fluctuated between the roles
of leader and laggard. This process has been “closely
linked to the struggle between the often competing
norms of economic growth, energy efficiency, inter‐
national contribution, and environmental protection”
(Hattori, 2007, p. 75). Key actors shaping Japan’s domes‐
tic climate policy are the Ministry of Economy Trade and
Industry (METI) and the MOE, while the government
largely takes a back‐seat role. Whereas the METI pro‐
motes economic growth and energy efficiency, the MOE
is pushing for stronger environmental protection includ‐
ing climate action. The power balance between these
two usually favours the METI and the (heavy) industries
it represents (Sofer, 2016; Watanabe, 2011).
A noteworthy exception to this dynamic was the sec‐
ond half of the 1990s when Japan positioned itself as
a climate leader and hosted international climate nego‐
tiations. In this context, the MOFA became involved in
climate policy debates and the Liberal Democratic Party
Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto (1996–1998) pushed
for an ambitious climate policy, including the promo‐
tion of greater awareness of the “global warming prob‐
lem.” Against this backdrop, the notion of environmental
protection and an international contribution outweighed
concerns about the economic costs of climate change
mitigation (Hattori, 2007). Support by the MOFA and the
prime minister tipped the scale in the inter‐ministerial
competition between the METI and the MOE in favour
of the position advocated by theMOE (Kameyama, 2002,
2017; Tiberghien & Schreurs, 2010; Watanabe, 2011).
After the US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in
2001, raising concerns about the international com‐
petitiveness of Japan’s industry, the balance of power
shifted back to the METI‐sponsored discourse on cli‐
mate policy in which “the cost side” of mitigation was
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emphasised (Kameyama, 2017, p. 170). Following a UK
proposal to include climate security in the UN Security
Council agenda in 2007, the MOE published a Report on
Climate Security. However, it quickly dropped the term,
arguably due to climate security being outside the scope
of Japanese conceptions of security and to avoid imping‐
ing on the security responsibilities of the Ministry of
Defence (Kameyama & Ono, 2021).
The shift from leader to laggard in the 2000s was
exacerbated after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear acci‐
dent in 2011. Successive administrations under Prime
Minister Shinzō Abe (2012–2020) were characterised
by the “prioritisation of economic growth over environ‐
mental issues, and hence the greater bureaucratic influ‐
ence of the METI over the MOE” (Incerti & Lipscy, 2018,
p. 632). While the government pushed for nuclear reac‐
tor restarts in the name of climate change mitigation, it
had, in fact, lost power to implement its nuclear energy
policy (Koppenborg, 2021), which led to a significant
increase in Japan’s reliance on coal to replace discontin‐
ued nuclear power plants.
Internationally, Japan was criticised for submitting
unambitious emissions reduction targets for the 2015
Paris Climate Summit (Kameyama, 2017). “Unwilling
to give up Japan’s status as an important contribu‐
tor to global climate change efforts” (Incerti & Lipscy,
2018, p. 629), Japan was under pressure to present
an improved climate strategy when it hosted the G20
in 2019. Japan’s long‐term strategy under the Paris
Agreement “for the first time in the history of Japanese
official decisions on climate change…declared that reduc‐
ing GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions would stimulate
economic growth rather than viewing it only as an eco‐
nomic burden” (Kameyama, 2021, p. 77). Hence, toward
the end of Abe’s term, there were apparent efforts to
reconcile the focus on economic growth with climate
change mitigation efforts and the desire to exhibit inter‐
national leadership.
Abe’s successor, Yoshihide Suga, has also expressed
his intention for Japan to assume an international
climate leadership role. Following climate neutrality
announcements by several countries, in 2020, Suga
announced the goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.
At the time of writing, the Suga administration is in the
process of hammering out revised emissions reduction
targets for the Climate Summit in November 2021.
Interestingly, in the past decade, cities and non‐state
actors have emerged as a potential force for change
in Japan’s climate policy. Cities with ambitious climate
action plans, with the Tokyo Metropolitan Government
as the most famous example, became dynamic con‐
trasts to Japan’s otherwise lacklustre climate pol‐
icy (Koppenborg, 2018; Sofer, 2016). After the Paris
Agreement, many non‐state actors in Japan began set‐
ting more ambitious targets for greenhouse gas reduc‐
tions than the government (Kameyama, 2021).
What is driving changes in Japan’s otherwise METI‐
dominated climate policy and discourse? Overall, “inter‐
national climate politics are one of the largest factors
affecting Japan’s climate policy” as Japan seeks to con‐
tribute to international climate action (Watanabe, 2011,
p. 28). If the MOFA and the government, most notably
the prime minister, begin framing climate action as part
of Japan’s international contribution, it can shift the bal‐
ance of power in favour of the MOE’s more ambitious
climate policy stance and introduce a reframing of cli‐
mate change. In addition, Japan’s involvement with the
G7/8 and the position of other states, most notably the
US, can impact Japan’s climate policy (Kameyama, 2017;
Tiberghien & Schreurs, 2010). Furthermore, the recent
rise of Japanese non‐state climate action is partly influ‐
enced by international movements in the context of the
2015 Paris Agreement negotiations (Kameyama, 2021).
Regarding the impetus for the adoption of “climate
security” language in Japan in recent years, we expect
that it either came from international climate politics or
local and non‐state actors in Japan. We further suppose
that the climate change discourse put forward by the
METI will remain hegemonic unless the MOE’s climate
crisis language gains support from other ministries and
the government, most importantly the prime minister.
To assess a potential shift in Japan’s climate‐change
discourse, this article draws on securitisation theory
and discourse analysis, outlined in the following section.
An analysis of Japan’s climate discourse should include
the ministries involved, i.e., the MOE, the METI, and
the MOFA, as well as other stakeholders, including the
primeminister and other Liberal Democratic Party power
brokers, cities, and non‐state actors. The analysis first
focuses on the main ministries involved, subsequently
broadens the scope to include other Japanese stakehold‐
ers, and then situates Japan’s climate change discourse
in the literature on Japan’s climate policy and discourse.
Finally, it discusses potential explanations for change.
2. Securitisation Theory and Discourse Analysis
Securitisation is a concept developed by the so‐called
Copenhagen School in the late 1990s (Buzan et al., 1998,
p. 26).More recently, the environment as a study domain
has attracted the attention of securitisation scholars
(Balzacq et al., 2016). Securitisation can be thought of
as the elevation of an issue from the sphere of politics to
the sphere of security, i.e., the construction of a security
issue.When an issue is securitised, it is deemed so impor‐
tant that extraordinary measures must be taken immedi‐
ately to ensure the survival of a referent object—in our
case, the Japanese nation. Securitisation is carried out
by one or more securitising actors who try to convince a
relevant audience about the existential threat posed by
a specific issue and the need to undertake extraordinary
measures (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24). In this case, the
relevant audience are the abovementioned key climate
policy actors.
Discourses can be thought of as temporarily fixed
constellations of meaning in which signifiers (words,
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objects, and actions) are given specific meaning by
their linkages to other signifiers. Signifiers can thus
have widely different meanings in different discourses
depending on which other signifiers they are placed in
relation to. Drawing on an example by Howarth (2000,
p. 9), an ecological discourse might conceive of a “for‐
est” as “an object of intrinsic natural beauty,” whereas
a capitalist discourse might frame the same forest as
“an obstacle to the building of amotorway.” In the former
discourse, the signifiers “forest” and “beauty” are tied
together, while in the latter, the “forest” might be seen
as a “business opportunity.” Needless to say, these two
discourses structure widely different understandings of
the forest and what should be done with it (preserva‐
tion/destruction). It is therefore important to investigate
word linkages in the text under analysis.
We should point out that we do not imply that dis‐
courses directly cause action. But we do argue that pow‐
erful discourses have enabling and constraining effects
on actors through their ability to render certain prac‐
tices logical and others illogical (Doty, 1993). This means
that the subsequent discourse analysis will not be able
to predict the extent to which Japan’s climate policy will
change, but the discovery of a burgeoning securitisa‐
tion discourse would demonstrate that the “conditions
of possibility” (Weldes & Saco, 1996, p. 395) for serious
climate action have materialised.
Since we are interested in examining the extent to
which climate change is being securitised in Japan, it is
necessary to clarify what a securitising discourse looks
like. A minimum requirement is the framing of climate
change as an existential threat that requires extraordi‐
nary measures. However, we would also suggest that to
speak of a full‐fledged securitising discourse, antagonism
against the status quomust also be present in some form
or another. This is because a securitising discourse is
by nature status quo challenging as it seeks to radically
revise conventional wisdom about what the main secu‐
rity threats are.
In the following, we conceptualise three degrees of
securitisation: non‐securitisation, moderate securitisa‐
tion, and strong securitisation. The first refers to dis‐
courses that altogether refrain from framing climate
change as an existential threat. The second points to
discourses that frame climate change as an existential
threat but are less clear about extraordinary measures
and refrain from using antagonistic language toward cli‐
mate change’s culprits. US President Joe Biden (2021,
para. 9), for example, has talked about the need to
“confront the existential threat of climate change,” but
he does not single out climate perpetrators. The third
signifies discourses that both frame climate change
as an existential threat requiring extraordinary mea‐
sures and exhibit antagonism toward actors fuelling cli‐
mate change, e.g., oil and gas companies, indifferent
or slow‐moving politicians, climate change deniers, etc.
The speech by activist Greta Thunberg at the 2019
UN Climate Action Summit is a good example: “People
are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are
collapsing. We are at the beginning of a mass extinc‐
tion, and all you can talk about is money and fairy
tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!”
(Thunberg, 2019b). The statements by UN Secretary‐
General António Guterres (2019) at the same event are
not as combative as Greta Thunberg’s, but they clearly
condemn activities that further fuel climate change:
“Is it common sense to give trillions in hard‐earned
taxpayers’ money to the fossil fuel industry to boost
hurricanes, spread tropical diseases, and heighten con‐
flict?” The antagonistic warnings by Greta Thunberg and
António Guterres represent strong securitisation while
US President Joe Biden’s statement representsmoderate
securitisation language due to the lack of antagonism.
To examine whether Japan is moving toward securi‐
tisation of climate change, it is necessary to analyse the
major competing climate change discourses in Japan and
the power balance between them. The analysis draws on
numerous written documents: ministries’ annual papers,
government members’ statements in the Japanese par‐
liament (Diet of Japan), the prime minister’s speeches at
international climate conferences, cities’ emergency dec‐
larations, and climate NGOs’ statements. In the following
analysis, we will identify how these documents place cli‐
mate change in relation to other signifiers and thereby
sketch out the extent of securitisation in Japan’s climate
change discourse.
3. Discourse Analysis
The simplest method to discern differences between rel‐
evant ministries’ attitudes toward climate change is a
word count of key terms. We have excluded the Ministry
of Defence from the discourse analysis because it is not
involved in climate policymaking and because its 2020
white paper hardly contains any references to climate
change. As seen in Table 1, unlike the MOE, neither the
METI nor theMOFAhas adopted the term “climate crisis’’
in their white papers.While these numbers demonstrate
whether these ministries have adopted a climate crisis
framing or not, they do not reveal the specific ways in
which theministries articulate different discourses on cli‐
mate change. The following discourse analysis seeks to
show how the MOE, the METI, and the MOFA frame cli‐
mate change in their 2020 white papers.
3.1. METI, MOE, and MOFA White Paper Analysis
3.1.1. Crisis Framing
The natural starting point for a climate change discourse
analysis is to look at how the respective white papers
incorporate the term “climate change” into their dis‐
courses. We can label the MOE discourse as a securiti‐
sation discourse because it unmistakably frames climate
change as an existential threat “that shakes the foun‐
dation of existence for humanity and all living beings”
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Table 1. Appearance of key terms in the ministries’ annual papers.
Keywords (climate concerns) MOE METI MOFA
Climate crisis (kikō kiki) 5 0 0
Climate change (kikō hendō) 495 49 81
Survival (seizon) 10 0 6
Societal change (shakai henkaku) 96 0 1
Decarbonisation (datsu‐tanso) 162 60 4
Note: Derived from a keyword search in the METI (2020), the MOE (2020), and the MOFA (2020).
(MOE, 2020, p. 20). The crisis framing is clearly inspired
by international developments. The first reference to “cli‐
mate crisis” reads as follows:
Among the world’s main leaders, there is a growing
sense of risk. Furthermore, on the grassroots level,
particularly overseas, there are demonstrations by
young people, demanding countermeasures against
climate change, as well as a growing movement by
local governments to declare a “climate crisis,” so
now we are living in an age that can be described as
a “climate crisis” (MOE, 2020, p. 3).
Almost the entire first chapter is dedicated to the neg‐
ative effects of climate change. To drive home the fact
that climate change has real‐life consequences and is
an existential threat for everyone, pages six to nine are
devoted to natural disasters that have struck Japan and
other countries in recent years. Each disaster is described
in detail, including the number of deaths, buildings
destroyed, and estimated costs. This is followed by a sec‐
tion that spells out the scientific relation between cli‐
mate change and these disasters (MOE, 2020, pp. 9–18).
The MOE paper links climate change to different nega‐
tively loaded signifiers, such as disasters, extreme rain
and drought, rising sea levels, the spread of infectious
diseases, crop failure, extinction of wildlife, and disrup‐
tions of human societies. Hence, the meaning that is
given to climate change in theMOEdiscourse is that of an
all‐encompassing and potentially all‐ending threat that
must take precedence over all other threats.
In contrast, the METI paper makes no mention of a
“climate crisis,” but the paper does warn of two crises
of a radically different nature (METI, 2020, pp. 323–327):
1) a hypothetical “supply crisis,” in which Japan’s tradi‐
tional oil suppliers are no longer able or willing to supply
Japan due to unforeseen emergencies and 2) a “domes‐
tic crisis,” in which natural disasters damage oil and gas
stockpiles. To the extent that there are securitisation
moves in the METI paper, these moves are limited to the
securing of a steady supply of oil and gas—commodities
that have adverse effects on climate change. Although
the term “climate change” is used 49 times and theMETI
paper refers to the “climate change problem” (p. 85) and
“the fight against climate change” (p. 96), the term is
never followed by an explanation of the negative conse‐
quences on humans, animals, or the planet. Hence, it is
left unclear to the reader exactly why climate change is
a problem and why it needs to be fought.
Similarly, the MOFA diplomatic bluebook contains
many references to climate change, but hardly any
descriptions of its effects. While traditional security
threats, such as North Korea’s missiles and China’s mili‐
tary build‐up, are said to constitute a “very severe secu‐
rity environment” (MOFA, 2020, p. 12), no such trepi‐
dation is expressed in the passages concerning climate
change. The “crisis” label is attached to several conflicts
and issues, such as the “Syrian crisis” (p. 123) or the
“humanitarian crisis” of refugees (p. 204), but climate
change is never framed as such. Climate change is occa‐
sionally framed as a “problem” (p. 242) or a “global issue”
(p. 11), but mostly qualifiers are absent. On page 11,
the paper states that “the severity of natural disasters
is forecast to continue to intensify with the effects of
climate change.” It is noteworthy that this is the only
passage in the whole paper where climate change is
directly linked to real‐life effects. All other mentions of
climate change fail to make this linkage, giving readers
the impression that climate change is an abstract prob‐
lem largely detached from their lives. In fact, climate
change is almost alwaysmentioned as one ofmany items
in list‐ups of problems facing the world. No prioritisation
is given to climate change.
The clear causality between climate change and cri‐
sis/disaster in the MOE paper is virtually non‐existent in
the other papers. Since neither the MOFA nor the METI
identifies climate change as a particularly threatening
issue, this contributes to the framing of climate change
as a non‐urgent problem.
3.1.2. Calls for Action
The discursive difference between the white papers can
also be discerned by how they suggest that climate
change should be dealt with. In line with its securitis‐
ing nature, the MOE white paper argues that climate
change must be countered with extraordinary measures.
The clearest example of this is found in the introduc‐
tion. It states that to secure a liveable environment for
future generations, “our traditional societal system and
everyday habits of mass‐production, mass‐consumption,
and mass‐waste must be revaluated” (MOE, 2020, p. 3),
i.e., a critique of the consumerist way of life. The paper
also argues for the necessity of “transforming our current
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economic and societal systems and initiating a paradigm
shift” (p. 35). As shown in Table 1, the term “societal
change” is mentioned 96 times in the paper. By warn‐
ing that climate change will lead to “grave problems for
which traditional measures no longer work,” the MOE
follows the securitisation formula of calling for extraor‐
dinary measures “outside the normal bounds of political
procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24).
Given that the METI paper presents interruptions in
Japan’s fossil fuel supply, rather than climate change, as
its greatest concern, it is not surprising that the most
emphatic policy proposals in the paper are not related to
climate change, but rather to securing a stable supply of
oil, gas and coal. The METI paper calls on the Japanese
government to strengthen its “resource diplomacy”
(shigen gaikō; METI, 2020, p. 36) to ensure “friendly rela‐
tions” with supplier nations (p. 226). In short, the clear‐
est policy proposals in theMETI paper concern the stable
supply of the very commodities that are most damaging
to the environment. The METI paper acknowledges cli‐
mate change as a problem, but unlike the MOE’s sweep‐
ing calls for action, the METI paper’s suggestions are
incremental, technocratic, and highly business oriented.
All suggestions essentially boil down to innovation and
technology, thus downplaying the MOE’s calls for more
radical societal change, a term that is not even men‐
tioned in the METI paper. The paper advocates “discon‐
tinuous innovation” (hirenzoku‐na inobēshon) that will
create “new technologies that are completely different
from those that exist in today’s society” (p. 87). It also
frames the effectiveness of Japan’s thermal power plants
as a contribution to decarbonisation.Moreover, theMETI
insists on the export of Japan’s “cutting‐edge” power
plants and “clean coal technology” to these countries as
a “practical climate change countermeasure’’ (p. 282).
The METI clearly views the struggle against climate
change as a battlefield where businesses should stand at
the forefront. By getting businesses to pollute less and
invest in green technologies, a “virtuous cycle of environ‐
ment and growth” is said to be achievable (METI, 2020,
p. 94). The METI seeks to incentivise ecological business
practices through “green finance promotion,” or, in other
words, funding of companies that invest in green tech‐
nologies or take steps to reduce their carbon footprint.
The definition of “green industrial activity” should not be
too strict, it argues, for fear that the business community
could lose its interest. In practice, this means that com‐
panies and projects become eligible for green funding
if they can show that they “contribute to the transition
toward improved GHG [greenhouse gas] emission reduc‐
tion and low‐carbon economies” (p. 93). Needless to say,
such a loose standard of green funding enables a gradu‐
alist approach by the corporate sector. In sum, the mea‐
sures suggested by the METI either run counter to fight‐
ing climate change (securing oil, gas, and coal), or enable
incrementalism (more effective power plants, faith in the
innovation of revolutionary technologies, and loose stan‐
dards for green funding).
Like the METI, the MOFA calls for “business‐led dis‐
continuous innovation” that will create a “virtuous cycle
of environment and growth” (MOFA, 2020, p. 215; both
phrases come from Japan’s 2019 long‐term strategy
under the Paris Agreement). The MOFA paper acknowl‐
edges that divestment from fossil fuel‐related industries
can be one way to mitigate climate change, but stresses
that “divestment alone cannot address climate change”
(p. 215). Accordingly, it holds that climate change should
be fought by offering companies financial incentives
to innovate green technologies (p. 215). These policies
strongly resemble those in the METI paper. The paper
also outlines how climate change features in Japan’s
foreign policy. Here, it points out Japan’s USD 3 bil‐
lion contribution to the Green Climate Fund, aimed at
helping developing countries implement climate change
mitigation measures, as well as Japan’s Joint Crediting
Mechanism, which allows Japan to list greenhouse gas
reductions in other countries as part of its own nation‐
ally determined contribution to the Paris Agreement if it
has provided these countries with low‐carbon technolo‐
gies. Hence, theMOFA’s calls for action are largelymarket‐
based and business‐friendly. There is nothing in the paper
that comes close to advocacy for extraordinarymeasures.
The MOFA and METI papers share an incremen‐
tal, business‐oriented approach and a belief in innova‐
tion in their discussion of climate change policy. They
thus reject the MOE’s plea for extraordinary measures,
i.e., a fundamental transformation of Japan’s economic,
energy, and societal systems.
3.1.3. Lack of Antagonism
There are limits to the MOE’s securitisation moves, how‐
ever. This is particularly palpable in the absence of antag‐
onistic language, i.e., no criticism of polluting industries,
Japan’s insufficient climate policy, or positions by com‐
peting ministries like the METI. The environmental prob‐
lems in the MOE white paper appear like crimes with‐
out a perpetrator. It should be remembered that a white
paper is supposed to be a representation of the govern‐
ment position and requires Cabinet approval for publica‐
tion, so there are limits to howantagonistic awhite paper
can be. Nonetheless, subtle criticism of other discourses
and even governmental policy is possible even in a white
paper. Rear and Jones, for example, show that when
neoliberal ideas began gaining traction in Japan in the
1990s and early 2000s, the white paper of the Ministry
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
criticised Japan’s education policy for placing “too much
emphasis on conformity” and advocated “reforms to pro‐
mote individualisation and diversification” (Rear & Jones,
2013, p. 382). This kind of critique of competing dis‐
courses and the policies they structure should be seen
as a type of antagonism in the context of a white paper.
Hence, the lack of even subtle antagonism means the
MOE white paper must be characterised as a moderate
securitisation attempt.
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3.1.4. Competing Discourses
In summary, we have shown that the MOE on the one
hand and the METI and MOFA on the other represent
two differing and often incompatible discourses on cli‐
mate change. The MOE represents a moderate secu‐
ritisation discourse, which sees climate change as an
existential threat that requires extraordinary measures
but omits mention of particular culprits. Conversely,
the MOFA and particularly the METI represent a non‐
securitising, incrementalist discourse,which sees climate
change as just one of many problems facing Japan and
does not advocate specific countermeasures beyond
technology innovation, efficiency improvements, and
business incentives, while actively promoting the use of
fossil fuels in the name of energy security.
3.2. Japanese Context
3.2.1. A Burgeoning Climate Securitisation Discourse?
This section examines the extent to which the moder‐
ate securitisation discourse introduced in the 2020 MOE
white paper resonates in Japan’s overall climate change
debate. To this end, Table 2 provides an overview of
other Japanese stakeholders’ climate policy frames.
Beginning with the Cabinet members, MOE Minister
Junichirō Koizumi first mentioned “climate crisis” on
February 25, 2020, in theDiet of Japan andhas continued
to do so since. By stressing that the MOE and the METI
“are not enemies,” he explicitly refutes antagonisms
toward theMETI’s status quo‐oriented policies. With the
Diet of Japan’s “climate emergency declaration,” many
parliamentarians have presumably adopted the climate
crisis framing in 2021, but, notably, Prime Minister Suga,
Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi (2019–) and his pre‐
decessor Tarō Kōno (2017–2019) have not used the term
“climate crisis” in the Diet of Japan (as of March 2021).
Looking at cities and NGOs, the Japan Climate
Initiative, the Kiko Network, and several cities adopted
climate securitisation language even before the MOE in
2020 and theDiet of Japan in 2021. A total of 40 local gov‐
ernments in Japan had issued climate emergency decla‐
rations by October 2020 (Climate Emergency Declaration
Campaign, 2020). While Table 2 only lists the climate
emergency declaration by Kamakura City, all local gov‐
ernments’ emergency declarations can be understood as
support for the securitisation move.
In sum, a moderate securitisation framing has gar‐
nered support from several Japanese cities and NGOs,
the MOE, and its minister as well as the nonpartisan
group of parliamentarians behind the Diet of Japan’s cli‐
mate emergency declaration. On the governmental level,
however, the incrementalist discourse with its focus on
promoting fossil fuels and on relying on future innova‐
tion is still hegemonic as it enjoys support by all major
actors except the MOE and Koizumi. While the efforts of
securitisation actors have led to the establishment of cli‐
mate securitisation as a new minor discourse, they have
so far failed to garner support from the actors needed to
transform it into a hegemonic one.
3.2.2. Impetus for Adopting Climate Securitisation
Language
This section discusseswhere the impetus for adopting cli‐
mate securitisation language has come from. Japanese
climate securitisation actors refer to international trends,
albeit different ones. As seen in Table 2, MOE Minister
Koizumi’s first reference to a “climate crisis” clearly
acknowledges the phrase’s foreign origins. The MOE
white paper also traces the language of crisis back
to world leaders, grassroots demonstrations overseas
and local government action (see the second quote
in Section 3.1.1). It can also be mentioned that the
MOE white paper emphasises the inspirational impact
Greta Thunberg’s climate activism has had on millions of
young people in Japan and abroad (MOE, 2020, p. 21).
The Diet of Japan’s climate emergency declaration sim‐
ilarly cited global perceptions as its impetus for action
(see Table 2). The Japan Climate Initiative draws inspi‐
ration from “organisations of various non‐state actors
[that] are getting underway in other countries” (Japan
Climate Initiative, 2018, p. 1), while Kamakura City links
its own climate emergency declaration to the global
trend among cities to adopt such declarations (Kamakura
City Council, 2019). Japanese securitisers were clearly
inspired by international climate politics.
How about the international influence on the govern‐
ment? US President Joe Biden has repeatedly used the
term “climate crisis” since taking office in January 2021.
In theDiet of Japan, Sugamadehis firstmentionof climate
change only after Joe Biden was elected as US President.
Both Suga and Motegi almost always mention climate
change in the context of the Japan–US alliance. This sug‐
gests that their concern about climate change is mainly
aimed at strengthening the Japan–US alliance. Given this
focus and the US’ traditionally strong influence on Japan,
one might have expected Suga to adopt crisis language
when attending Joe Biden’s Earth Day Climate Summit on
April 22. However, Suga refrained from doing so despite
declaring his intention to “lead global public opinion”
(Suga, 2021, para. 1). Hence, the adoption of climate cri‐
sis language by theUS under Joe Bidenmay have ledmore
Cabinetmembers to address climate change in the Diet of
Japan, but, so far, has not led to the Japanese government
taking up similar climate securitisation language.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
This article set out to investigate the extent to which
Japanese stakeholders are securitising global warm‐
ing. The key finding is that securitisation actors—
Japanese cities and climate NGOs, the MOE, and
its minister Koizumi, as well as a multi‐partisan
group of parliamentarians—have established climate
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Table 2. Climate change framing by stakeholders in Japanese climate policy.
Actor Category Actor Name Crisis Framing Action Calls Antagonism
Civil Society Kiko Network “Climate change—a threat to the
survival of our species’’





“Whether [the Paris Agreement]
goal will be achieved or not will
affect the survival of human
beings’’
“Expanding and accelerating
efforts toward a decarbonised
society’’
“Working with each other and





City Kamakura “The global environment is
deteriorating due to climate
change’’
“We are calling for the
announcement of a ‘climate
emergency declaration’”
“Our goal is to achieve zero
emission of greenhouse gasses”
—




“We share the global perception
that ‘the global warming problem
now has exceeded the realm of
climate change and entered into
a situation of climate crisis’”
“Strive for the immediate
realisation of a decarbonised
society, carry out a reorientation




— “By 2050, Japan will aim to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions
to net‐zero’’
“Addressing climate change is no
longer a constraint on economic
growth, rather it will lead to
dynamic economic growth” by
“focusing on a virtuous cycle of
the economy and the
environment.’’





contributions in the field of
climate change has become the
most important task for our
foreign policy’’
—






“Climate change is now seen as
such a serious issue that abroad
it is even referred to as a climate
crisis’’
“There is a growing perception in
all areas of Japan that climate








Notes: Created by the authors based on the METI (2020), Diet of Japan (2020), Japan Climate Initiative (2018), Kamakura City Council
(2019), Kiko Network (2021), MOE (2020), Suga (2020), as well as a keyword search of statements by Suga, Koizumi, Motegi, and Kōno
in minutes of Diet of Japan debates during their ministerial period, or until March 4, 2021, available at Diet of Japan (2017–2021).
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securitisation as a newminor discourse. In doing so, they
were clearly influenced by recent securitisation trends in
international climate politics.
In contrast to the strong securitisation language used
by UN Secretary‐General António Guterres and climate
activist Greta Thunberg, among others, Japanese securi‐
tisation actors, including civil society, pursue moderate
securitisation by refraining from adopting combative lan‐
guage against specific culprits. One explanation for this
might be the nature of civil society in Japan. According
to Pekkanen (2003, p. 133), “it is hard for autonomous
groups to become large and hard for large groups to be
autonomous” due to the licensing process for so‐called
non‐profit organisations, which includes considerable
ministerial oversight and, therefore, expectations of
compliance to the governmental line. Furthermore, “the
LDP’s [Liberal Democratic Party] return to power appears
to have diminished the role of the strongest environ‐
mental advocates,” including the removal of the head
of the Kiko Network from policy advisory councils (Sofer,
2016, p. 14). Hence, the Kiko Network’s choice of lan‐
guage might simply be a strategic decision to avoid fur‐
ther exclusion from policy discussions. As for the Japan
Climate Initiative, it should be mentioned that it is part
of a global network committed to working with govern‐
ments rather than to lobby for stronger action.
Why did the MOE adopt a moderate securitisation
discourse? Most crucially, the MOE’s ability to push for
stronger climate action depends on its ability to convince
the METI to shift Japan’s energy policy, since the major‐
ity of Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions comes from the
energy sector. Hence, non‐antagonism most likely repre‐
sents a strategic decision by the MOE to avoid antagonis‐
ing theMETI and increase the chances of convincing it to
adopt stronger climate policies.
While the efforts of securitisation actors have led
to the establishment of climate securitisation as a new
minor discourse, they have so far failed to garner sup‐
port from the prime minister and the METI. These find‐
ings are in line with previous findings of the impor‐
tance of prime ministerial involvement to bring about
change in Japan’sMETI‐dominated climate discourse and
policy (Kameyama, 2017; Tiberghien & Schreurs, 2010;
Watanabe, 2011). Rather than adopting climate securiti‐
sation language, Suga (2020) repeated the language in
the 2019 long‐term strategy under the Paris Agreement
almost word by word at the 2020 Climate Ambition
Summit—as did theMETI andMOFA papers. The analysis
has revealed that the framing of climate change mitiga‐
tion as an opportunity for economic growth has appar‐
ently replaced the former hegemonic METI‐sponsored
framing of climate change action as an economic burden.
The broad adoption of the economic opportunity fram‐
ing, introduced by Suga’s predecessor Shinzō Abe, fur‐
ther suggests that primeministerial support is crucial for
a new discourse to become hegemonic in Japan.
Comparing Japan to the “climate crisis” language
used by Joe Biden and the EU in its updated national
determined contributions for the Paris Agreement, it
becomes clear that Japan is lagging international devel‐
opments. Japan’s position as a leader or laggard has pre‐
viously been explained by the relative weight attributed
to the conflicting goals of economic growth, inter‐
national contribution, and environmental protection
(Hattori, 2007). Even though the Suga government
stresses climate change mitigation as an opportunity for
economic growth and seeks to exhibit global leadership,
the government is far from leading the global climate
change discourse—or international climate politics for
that matter. Considering Schoppa’s (1993, p. 383) find‐
ing that foreign pressure will “produce the most posi‐
tive results when these strategies resonate with domes‐
tic politics,” the government’s avoidance of the term
“climate crisis” can be explained by its insistence on
promoting coal, historically the biggest contributor to
global warming.
In conclusion, the Japanese government has yet to
walk the walk after talking the international contribu‐
tion talk. Hitherto lacklustre greenhouse gas reduction
targets under the Paris Agreement and support for fos‐
sil fuel projects garnered Japan two unflattering Fossil
of the Day Awards at the 2019 UN Climate Summit,
which the Climate Action Network awards to countries it
regards as laggards. Suga’s predecessor Shinzō Abe was
further denied the chance to speak at the UN Climate
Action Summit in September 2019, which was designed
to showcase climate leaders’ actions. These setbacks
notwithstanding, the emergence of a moderate securi‐
tisation discourse has at least created the conditions of
possibility for more comprehensive and drastic climate
policies going forward. The extent to which this opening
for change in Japanwill be pursued is an important object
for future research.
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